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I
n this review I pay special attention to the con-
struction of ethnographic encounters in Mialet’s 
book. By ethnographic encounter, I mean how the 
knowing subject of this particular book is con-
structed, and of course how the knowing subject 
whom Stephen Hawking represents figures in it. How-
ever, to read it with this focus is to betray in some way 
the book’s main arguments, so I will first try to sum-
marize some of Mialet’s main ideas.
Mialet attempts to demystify the Western modern 
notion that it is only an individual brilliant mind 
(or brain) in itself that produces science. In the first 
page of her acknowledgments she succinctly states 
her main argument: “an individual is always a col-
lective,” (p. vii) and from the very beginning, she is 
skeptical of the myth of the almost incorporeal ge-
nius who creates theories and science in radical iso-
lation. She is interested in the collective that hides 
behind the figure of the genius. Perhaps there is no 
better “subject of research” than Hawking, a man 
who has been constructed by many actors and net-
works as a unique genius, and as an indisputable 
example of the triumph of immaterial mind over 
material body.
Contrary to any easy assumption by the readers (ap-
pealing to the title or the deceiving cover of the book, 
in which we see an isolated, frozen statue of Hawking 
floating in space), this is not a biography of Hawking, 
or at least not a common one. This is because the no-
tion of biography supposes that no matter how com-
plex a person’s life is, it can be wrapped up in a book, 
and especially because it presupposes that it is about 
one coherent unity (called the subject or individual), 
without acknowledging how that apparent coherence 
or unity is produced. For Mialet the knowing subject, 
of which Hawking is an ideal type, is essentially an 
extended body.
The knowing subject does not simply have an extended 
body, but is an extended body. Hawking’s extended body is 
the ever-changing collective or assemblage of assistants, 
machines, physicists, PhD students, diagrammers, jour-
nalists, nurses, archivists, family members, the ethnog-
rapher herself and his own flesh-and-blood body, who 
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produce, reproduce and stabilize the identity of both 
Hawking and HAWKING (with capital letters), but which 
also allow for a place to disrupt it. Just for clarification: 
Hawking stands for the individual and bodily materiality 
that this man is, while HAWKING is the idealized figure 
of the genius that tends to eclipse both his singularity 
and his sociality. Interestingly, the book does not explore 
these poles exclusively, but also what is in-between them. 
That is, it looks at the production of HAWKING through 
the erasure of Hawking and many other networks of the 
(labor of) animate and inanimate subjects.
Mialet sometimes speaks of Hawking as a (sociologi-
cal) ideal type, and this is very counterintuitive from 
the start not only because the man is considered a ge-
nius, but also because his different disabilities have 
made it impossible for him to move, speak and perform 
many other physical activities. Consequently, he can-
not write and needs several machines and people to do 
what common sense tells us most people do on their 
own (including his own survival). According to Mialet, 
it is these disabilities and the evident vulnerability of 
his body that illustrate the disavowed dependencies of 
flesh-and-blood bodies, as well as the fact that “Hawk-
ing has to delegate more than anyone else,” (p. 77) thus 
making visible the fact that scientists delegate (in the 
process of) the production of knowledge.
While arguably Mialet’s ideas may seem to erase the 
individuality of Hawking at first, she also (partially) 
resists this reading or movement. Mialet attempts to 
respect Hawking’s opacities, while providing a space 
for his agency, singularity and individuality. But this is 
not an easy task. While, Mialet repeatedly says that her 
book does not attempt to answer who Hawking really is, 
it is very concerned with the question of where Hawking 
is. She raises this question explicitly in several parts of 
her book and ends her monograph by once again asking 
about the location of Hawking in time and space.
If we continue to explore Mialet’s concern with asking 
where Mr. Hawking is, it would lead us to a discussion of 
several interconnected topics: about the place of the eth-
nographer in this book as well as the relations of power 
implied in it and, more generally, about the (innovative) 
methods of this ethnography. Even though Mialet de-
scribes her monograph as one of empirical philosophy, 
she reserves an important place for ethnography and, in 
a way, there is nothing exceptional in the fact that a per-
son like Hawking is the leading character of an ethnog-
raphy. In some senses, he is exceptionally vulnerable, or 
his flesh-and-blood body is extremely vulnerable.
I don’t think it is necessary to say much about the tra-
dition of exploring the vulnerability of others in so-
ciology and anthropology, but perhaps it will help to 
mention briefly that both these disciplines (especially 
anthropology) have constructed themselves by con-
structing natives, victims and savages to illuminate, 
rescue or simply discard. What is paradoxical is that 
it is not so much the native who seems to need an eth-
nographer, but vice versa. That being said, it is impor-
tant to raise the caveat that some of the most brilliant 
and courageous works in these two fields explore dif-
ferent dynamics in, for lack of a better term, “vulnera-
ble” communities. But it is precisely in relation to said 
tradition within the social sciences that this ethnog-
raphy is also very exceptional, “because Hawking is 
not just his own vulnerable flesh-and-blood body, but 
even more importantly, because he is at the very top 
in the hierarchy of scientific knowledge. The place of 
philosophers and especially of ethnographers in that 
hierarchy is a dubious one at best, and at worst, it is at 
the very bottom. Thus, Mialet’s relationship to Hawk-
ing cannot be framed in the typical scenario of the 
ethnographer and the native surrounded by colonial 
phantoms. Furthermore, Hawking himself cannot be 
interviewed the way mere natives are. Here, he upsets 
one of the cornerstones of ethnography: the inter-
view encounter. His flesh-and-blood body can neither 
speak nor write, but with the support of his extended 
body (including his computer, the robotic voice that 
emanates from his body, his eyebrows, etc.), he is able 
to communicate.
Mialet’s interview of Hawking is not one of oral speech, 
but rather of writing, a delayed and slow writing that 
occupies an important place. This is of course ironic 
because in the typical ethnographic scenario, it is the 
ethnographer who takes notes in a field notebook, and 
also because in a typical ethnographic encounter, the 
ethnographer is the one who transcribes and summa-
rizes the words of the informant. In this case, however, 
Hawking himself has to synthesize his answers, several 
of which are based on recycling practices.
Another aspect that the Mialet-Hawking ethnographic 
encounter disrupts is the commonsensical notion that 
proximity guarantees a better grasp of, or a deeper in-
sight into the lives of others, of their subjectivities and 
social positionalities. The proximity-distance dichot-
omy is disrupted, and its implicit engagement with 
claims to originality and authenticity is rejected. These 
issues lead Mialet to raise a question of pivotal impor-
tance for the social (and many other) sciences: “What 
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difference does it make when one deals with texts as 
opposed to dealing with a person? With Hawking, this 
question becomes even more complicated, for in his 
presence, one is dealing with a kind of transcription” 
(p. 119). I think it becomes clearer here why Mialet 
seems to struggle with this “collective individual.” 
Her notion of individuality is so radically de-human-
ized and de-individualized that it seems to clash with 
the most pervasive and extended accounts of (Western 
human) individuality. So, while she struggles explor-
ing these landscapes, we (as readers) also struggle be-
cause of the counter-intuitiveness of her “individual.” 
Like Mialet, when we (as readers) get closer to (some 
of) Hawking’s identity affiliations in isolation, we si-
multaneously distance ourselves from him. Indeed, 
we seem to get lost because of the non-individuality 
of this notion of an individual (non-) human knowing 
subject. But perhaps “getting lost” is not such a bad 
idea after all.
Another aspect of this ethnography is (its) accountabil-
ity (or lack thereof). How can this monograph be ac-
countable to the subject/transcript Stephen Hawking? 
How can Hawking give an account of this explanation 
of his extended body? Here it is also important to re-
member that Hawking has a persistent “desire to inter-
vene in the writing of himself” (p. 116). Furthermore, 
to make things even more complicated, Hawking him-
self is a network of other people. So how can we be ac-
countable to them? I will mention Mialet’s response 
in a personal communication when she told me that 
Hawking could not be less interested in what she (the 
ethnographer, or marginal scientist?) had to say about 
him. She understood that since there are so many peo-
ple behind him producing accounts of him, he thought 
of her project as just one more journalistic account of 
him, or treated it that way. This is somewhat disap-
pointing for me, and I am sure that it was disappoint-
ing for Mialet as well. Why? Because the modern notion 
of the knowing subject is also constructed on the basis 
of another dichotomy, that of science versus common 
sense. Journalism is usually constructed as common 
sense, perhaps as a bit better informed than common 
sense usually is, but common sense nonetheless. Thus, 
the fact that an ethnographic (and long and engaged) 
project is constructed as interchangeable with an ev-
eryday journalist’s brief account disrupts many of the 
certainties of the social sciences. Perhaps this is yet 
another instance of Mr. Hawking’s agency. Neither he 
(nor his network) allows any monumentalizing in this 
particular ethnography.
There is a radical criticism implied in Hawking’s re-
fusal to differentiate anthropology from journalism. 
In the most optimistic view, it could counter some 
of the most elitist implications of how scientific 
knowledge is produced in the “West.” That would be 
an exciting approach taking into consideration Mi-
alet’s insights (such as how individuals are always 
collective) that can be of pivotal importance in the 
most-needed project of decolonizing and provincial-
izing the (Western-centered) social sciences. At the 
same time, however, Hawking’s refusal is based, at 
least at a certain level, on his own positioning in the 
field of the “real sciences,” for which anthropology, 
philosophy and journalism are apparently equally 
trivial and inexact. This is a move that needs to be 
countered, although I am not sure that the task is to 
be done by the ethnographer herself.
The Mialet-Hawking ethnographic encounter is even 
more disrupted by and disrupting because of the fact 
that the ethnographer herself is part of Hawking’s ex-
tended body, or of some of Hawking’s extended bod-
ies. The typical ethnographic encounter is based on 
the established boundaries between ethnographers 
and natives. But what happens when a boundary can-
not be clearly established? When one is not totally sure 
who is the “native” and who the “ethnographer,” or 
when this ethnographic economy and its traditional 
epistemologies are displaced? Can this kind of “new” 
ethnographic encounter be considered ethnographic 
at all? What kind of social landscapes are opened up 
by this new economy? Which are foreclosed? I don’t 
have any answers to these questions, but Mialet’s ar-
gument certainly forces us to reconsider some of the 
most treasured humanistic principles that lie behind 
the Western, human-centered ethnographic encoun-
ter and the idea of an individual with a monopoly on 
knowledge. Perhaps the idea of a non-human ethno-
graphic encounter is a worthy project that will allow 
us to recognize the non-humanity at the heart of the 
notion of humanity, which sounds like something 
worthy of almost any (scholarly) risk. 
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